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The Russian Banking Sector: 
Unsolved Problems Seven Years 
after the Crisis
Alfred Steinherr and Erik Klär
The Russian foreign exchange and financial market crisis of summer 1998
was caused by international movements of capital following the Asian cri-
sis, and it plunged the Russian commercial banks into major difficulties.
Practically the entire banking sector was hit by acute liquidity shortage.
The main cause of the banking crisis must be seen in the banking sector
regulation, which was defective if not lacking altogether. This encouraged
the banks to take big exchange rate risks on liabilities in foreign currencies,
and to lend with little risk diversification, which proved fatal in the crisis.
The method used by the Russian authorities to deal with the crisis was
also unorthodox by western standards. The crisis was overcome without
major restructuring in the banking sector and accomplished at astonish-
ingly little cost to the economy as a whole. However, the success in the form
of good growth rates in every year since 1998 only seemingly justifies this
neglect, for the relatively weak constitution of the banking sector in
Russia _ compared with other transition economies _ has certainly ham-
pered even better economic development. Although some more recent legis-
lative initiatives do give reason to hope for improvement here, powerful
interests are still preventing the optimal restructuring of the banking scene
that is necessary for the economy as a whole.
Undesirable developments in 
the early years of transition
The end of the socialist mono-banking system came in 1988 with the deci-
sion by the Soviet government to allow five specialist banks to operate
beside the central bank. They were the Agroprom bank, the Promstroibank,
the Sberbank, the Vnesheconombank and the Zhilsotsbank, and they were
intended to take over financing certain state programmes. In the same year
the law on cooperatives opened up for the first time the possibility of found-
ing 'null banks' financed with private capital, and the opportunity was then
eagerly seized, especially by companies. Under liberal conditions for market
access the number of licensed banks rose to more than 1300, even before the
Russian state was founded.
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After the establishment of the Russian Federation
the task of banking supervision and regulation fell to
the Russian central bank (RCB), although it retained
numerous links with the commercial banks. A large
number of commercial banks were set up by converting
former central bank branches, while the biggest banks
remained in state ownership, either directly or through
the RCB.
The highly volatile situation in the economy as a
whole in Russia in the early 1990s would have faced
even a well developed banking sector with considerable
problems. The situation was made more difficult for the
new Russian commercial banks in that the laws on pri-
vate enterprise were constantly being changed, so that
lending to the private sector bore additional risks. Con-
sequently, the banks scarcely operated as had been
intended, namely as mediators between savers and
investors; instead they developed other ways of extract-
ing profit. According to estimates by the World Bank
the hyper-inflation of 1992 and 1993 alone flooded assets
of the order of 6 to 9% of the gross domestic product
(GDP) into the banks _ while their capital amounted to
less than 1% of GDP.1 Negative real interest rates on
bank deposits while the banks themselves were lending
at considerable interest spreads in itself guaranteed
lucrative earnings.
However, the banks made a veritable fortune by
investing their rouble liabilities in dollar securities,
which rose considerably in value as inflation caused a
steep devaluation of the rouble. The extraordinarily
high profits helped to cement the power of the lobby of
banks and big industrial groups (which hold the major-
ity in most of the private banks) and in the mid-90s they
began to influence political decision-making in their
favour.
The Russian commercial banks also manoeuvred
with skill in the 1990s in their financial transactions
with the public sector. One example were short-term
government bonds (Gosudarstvennye kratkosrochnye
obligazii  _ GKO), which the government issued from
1994 to finance the public debt. Between 1994 and 1998
the government received the countervalue of around 15
billion US dollars for these bonds, but the nominal value
of the GKO on the primary market, which the banks
dominated, and from which foreigners had been
excluded after successful lobbying, was 70 billion US
dollars.2 Another source of funds lay in the banks'
responsibility for administering public funds, from
which, according to an estimate by the State Hearing
Chamber of the Russian Federation, the banks earned
more than 1.3 billion US dollars in 1995 and 1996 alone.3
With earnings prospects of this order it is hardly
surprising that 'normal' banking business held little
attraction, nor is it astonishing that the banking lobby
opposed any steps to introduce more stringent regula-
tion on the model of proven western standards, if this
would have meant lower earnings.
The Russian Banking Association opposed efforts in
this direction by the central bank in 1994 and 1995, and
it also succeeded in forcing a change in the management
of the central bank in its favour. That the Russian legis-
lature allowed the banking lobby to direct it away from
regulatory reforms that were meaningful and necessary
for the economy as a whole is only one example of the
state's co-responsibility for defects that have been char-
acteristic of the development of the banking sector in
Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Little interest in the role of 
financial intermediaries 
The banks ignored their real task. Companies outside
the big industrial groups were largely excluded from
lending or were only given loans at extremely high
interest rates. This strengthened the classical problem of
adverse selection4 which was to play a big part in the
crisis. However, in summer 1998 the influence of the
state, which was still undiminished, also hampered the
development of a banking sector dedicated to its role as
financial intermediary, and it must be held partly
responsible for the vulnerability of the sector.
Table 1 lists the 15 biggest banks in Russia. The
majority shareholder of by far the biggest, Sberbank, is
the RCB. Under a law passed in July 2002 to limit the
extent of the RCB's holdings in commercial banks, own-
ership of the second largest bank, Vneshtorgbank,
passed to the state.
Sberbank's dominant position _ its assets amount to
around one quarter of the Russian banking sector's total
assets _ is based on its considerable competitive advan-
tages. As a state bank it enjoys a state guarantee on
deposits, and as successor to the Soviet Monobank it has
branches all over Russia.
Thanks to these advantages the bank still dominates
the deposits market. In 2002 it still held around 75% of
1  William Easterly and Paulo Vieira da Cunha: 'Financing the Storm:
Macroeconomic Crises in Russia 1992-93', in: Economics of Transition,
vol. 2, no. 4, 2004, pp. 443-466.
2  Timothy Frye: 'Governing the Banking Sector in Russia', New York
University Draft, New York 2002.
3  Juliet Johnson: 'A Fistful of Roubles: The Rise and Fall of Banking in
Russia', Ithaca 2000.
4  The higher the interest rates, the smaller is the share of borrowers
whose calculations are soundly based and the bigger the share of
'speculators' of questionable standing.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 25/2005  291
total deposits and around 90% of deposits by private
households.5 So its competitors had little access to the
bank deposits of private savers as a main source of
financing, and that is still the case. As the domestic cap-
ital markets are still under-developed many commercial
banks can only finance their lending by borrowing in
foreign currencies from international banks and on for-
eign capital markets. The exclusion of the private banks
from the Russian deposits markets following privileges
granted to Sberbank, combined with the lack of regula-
tion of borrowing in foreign currencies, must therefore
be seen as one of the main reasons for the vulnerability
of the banking sector to the 1998 crisis.
Serious structural weaknesses the 
main cause of the banking crisis
In the years before the foreign exchange and financial
market crisis Russia profited from the interest of inter-
national investors worldwide in maintaining deposits in
newly industrializing countries. Stabilizing the currency
by fixing the exchange rate to the US dollar in July 1995,
the greater political security after Yelzin's re-election in
1996 and the opening of the GKO market to foreigners in
the same year set favourable conditions for investment
in Russia. The Russian share index rose by 142% in
1996 and by 184% in the first eight months of 1997.
However, from the end of 1997, with the Asian crisis
and the collapse of the Russian share market, fears grew
that Russia could suffer a similar fate to the southeast
Asian tiger economies. International investors hedged
against a collapse of the currency, in some cases with
forward contracts with Russian banks, and increasingly
shifted their investments into safer havens. The Russian
government experienced increasing difficulties in
extending its borrowing and in supporting the currency.
Then in August the rouble was finally freed and opera-
tions on the bond market suspended.
The crisis directed attention to serious structural
weaknesses in the Russian banking sector. Among other
things Sberbank's quasi monopoly meant that its com-
mercial bank competitors were borrowing abroad. At
the same time the banks had a big incentive to acquire
foreign currency on international markets. Even after
deduction of the high inflation rates yields could be
obtained on loans in Russia that were far above the rates
at which funds (mainly US dollars) could be borrowed
abroad.
This arbitrage business offered a secure source of
income, assuming that the exchange rate remained sta-
ble. And in fact just before the crisis broke the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) promised the Russian gov-
ernment a loan of billions precisely to stabiles the
exchange rate. Evidently the Russian commercial banks
interpreted this as an invitation to continue to work the
fertile field. Again owing to the lack of appropriate regu-
lation all the big commercial banks' liabilities in foreign
currencies in summer 1998 exceeded their assets many
times over. 75% of the liabilities in foreign currency
were concentrated in the 20 biggest Russian banks,
where they accounted for a total of 20% of total liabili-
ties.
The banks were also particularly exposed to risks
from forward contracts they had entered into in case, as
seemed ever more likely from the end of 1997, the rouble
would be devalued. In numerous cases the volume of
forward contracts was many times greater than the
bank's total assets.
The lack of risk diversification in lending is another
structural problem which, in fact, is still not satisfacto-
rily solved. A few customers still dominate the lending
business of their favourite banks. In 2001 the ten biggest
loans granted by smaller banks accounted on average
for 80% of their total loan portfolio; the figure for the
5  Cf. Alfred Steinherr: 'Russian Banking Since the Crisis of 1998'. Cen-
tre for European Policy Studies, Working Document, no. 209, Brussels
2004, p. 3. The trend is declining. At the end of 2004 the Sberbank's
share of deposits by the private sector only amounted to around 60%.
Table 1
The 15 Biggest Banks in Russia1
In million US dollars
Assets Capital
Sberbank 69 453 6 254
Vneshtorgbank 15 251 2 038
Gazprombank 12 746 1 386
Alfa-Bank 7 391 916
MDM-Bank 6 271 476
Bank of Moscow 5 509 599
Rosbank 4 989 480
International Moscow Bank 3 625 373
PSB 3 253 322
MeshPromBank 3 065 962
UralSib 3 041 392
Raiffeisen-Bank Austria 3 006 316
Promsvjasbank 2 116 202
Petrokommerz    2 009 263
Nomos-Bank 1 642 200
1 By assets as per 1 January 2005.
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medium-sized banks was around 60%, and it was still
as much as 45% for the big banks.6
Finally, the loss of customer confidence and the
resultant withdrawal of deposits amounting to between
14% and 45% in summer 1998 started a crisis through-
out Russia in which the biggest commercial banks were
particularly affected.7 And although the IMF argued
during the crisis that the entire banking sector was
largely insolvent the authorities in the Russian govern-
ment and the central bank treated the difficulties as a
typical liquidity crisis. One must ask whether its aware-
ness of the regulatory and structural problems in the
Russian banking sector should not have induced the
IMF to pursue a different policy in regard to the
exchange rate earlier.
The government imposed a 90-day moratorium on
foreign debts, so enabling the Russian banks with pre-
carious forward positions to keep their losses within
limits.8 Accounts with commercial banks threatened
with insolvency were, upon request, transferred by the
RCB to accounts with Sberbank in order to prevent the
escalation of withdrawal of deposits.9 And finally liquid-
ity to the amount of 46 billion roubles was provided at
rates well below the market rate. It was astonishing that
ultimately relatively few banks were closed, as table 2
shows.
Experience in other countries that have had to cope
with a comparable banking crisis suggests that up to
half the commercial banks fall victim to the subsequent
restructuring. One of the main reasons for the low num-
ber of closures in the Russian crisis can be seen in the
inadequacy of the capital of the Agency to Restructure
the Organization of the Banking Sector (ARKO) which
began work in 1999 _ its capital was 10 billion roubles,
less than half a percent of the balance sheet total of the
banking sector in 1997, and not nearly enough for its
task.
Moreover, ARKO was not independent.10 It used
most of its capital to buy up state bonds that were not
traded on the stock exchange and for a billion-rouble
loan to the Alfa Bank that was not in difficulties but
was evidently well connected. By 2003 ARKO had
restructured 14 banks and liquidated three. The total
expenditure on the restructuring measures amounted to
16 billion roubles, a very modest amount compared with
the typical costs of restructuring the banking scene after
a major crisis. The restructuring of the banking sector in
Turkey after the 2001 crisis involved costs estimated at
40 billion US dollars.11
Successful growth does not justify the 
crisis management
Empirical studies of banking crises have identified
essential conditions that should be fulfilled if a major
financial crisis is to be overcome successfully.12 A com-
prehensive restructuring programme needs to be set up
6  Cf. Filippo Ippolito: 'The Banking Sector Rescue in Russia', Bank of
Finland Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT) Online vol. 12,
Helsinki 2002.
7  Contrary to a widely held view the losses on state bonds were not the
main reason for the banks' insolvencies, cf. Alfred Steinherr loc. cit.,
p. 5. 
8  Cf. Alfred Steinherr, loc. cit, pp. 6f.
9  Although the transfer was voluntary on paper most of the commer-
cial banks had little choice. In view of the fact that the RCB is the
majority shareholder in Sberbank this may be a cause for some
unease.
Table 2
Number of Banks and Liquidations in Russia 1997 to 20051
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total number of banks registered with RCB 2 562 2 481 2 376 2 124 2 004 1 826 1 666 1 516 1 482
Year-on-year change x –81 –105 –252 –120 –178 –160 –150 –34
Number liquidated 52 73 100 258 144 216 178 153 37
1 At end of each year; 2005 30 April.
Source: Russian Central Bank.
10  The chairman of the management board of the RCB was appointed
chairman of the board of directors of ARKO, and the former deputy
chairman of the RCB was appointed director-general of ARKO.
11  Cf. Alfred Steinherr, Ali Tukel and Murat Ucer: 'The Turkish Bank-
ing Sector: Challenges and Outlook in Transition to EU Membership',
Centre for European Policy Studies, EU-Turkey Working Paper, no. 4,
Brussels 2004.
12  Cf. e.g. Cheryl Gray and Arnold Holle: 'Bank-Led Restructuring in
Poland: The Conciliation Process in Action', in: Economics of Transi-
tion, vol. 4, no. 2, 1996, pp. 349-370; Ibid, 'Bank-Led Restructuring in
Poland (II): Bankruptcy and its Alternatives', in: Economics of Transi-
tion, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 25-44; Helena Tang, Edda Zoli and Irina Klytch-
nikova: 'Banking Crises in Transition Economies: Fiscal Costs and
Related Issues', in: The World Bank, Policy Resarch Working Paper,
Series no. 2482, Washington D.C. 1999.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 25/2005  293
that includes both solutions for non-performing loans
and initiatives to improve the performance of new loans,
as well as reform of internal bank risk management.
The restructuring measures should be implemented rap-
idly, with transparent financing through tax revenue
preferable to non-transparent and potentially inflation-
ary central bank measures.
It is striking that the crisis managers in Russia did
not really adopt any of these suggestions. The crisis was
treated largely as a pure liquidity crisis and essential
steps to improve banking regulation were not taken.13
Nevertheless, the success appears to have justified the
authorities' action. In 1999 Russian GDP increased by
5.4% in real terms, and in 2000 by as much as 9%. Since
then it has settled at about 6% growth per year.
A current study by Thiessen14 on the relation
between the state of development of the financial system
and economic growth, on the other hand, comes to the
conclusion for Russia that the neglect to build up an effi-
cient financial sector has very probably led to consider-
able loss of growth potential. Thiessen used indicators
of the financial system from the study by King and
Levine15:
1. Broad money (M4) in relation to GDP
2. The commercial banks' domestic assets in relation to
the total assets of the commercial banks and the cen-
tral bank
3. Share of lending to the private non-financial sector in
total lending
4. The relation between lending to the private non-
financial sector and GDP.
In all these indicators Russia does show more or less
strong improvements between 1993 and 2002, but it still
lags behind other transition economies like Poland or
Hungary in all these areas. Especially the last of the
indicators, the importance of financial intermediation for
the economy, still shows a very low figure for Russia. In
the light of the subsequently confirmed conclusion
drawn by King and Levine that there are significant
relations between the state of development of the finan-
cial system and the development of capital accumula-
tion, economic growth and productivity growth, it can
therefore be argued that speedy action to tackle struc-
tural reforms in the banking and financial sector in Rus-
sia would certainly pay off.16
The Russian banking sector today: 
some promising developments since 
1998 ...
In their assessment of the Russian financial sector in
2003 the IMF and the World Bank concluded that
according to official data the Russian banks did by and
large have sufficient capital, although simulations have
shown that they are still vulnerable to developments
similar to those in 1998.17
The ratio of foreign debt to GDP has fallen to around
one quarter with the high level of economic growth in
recent years, while the currency reserves grew from 12
billion US dollars in 1999 to 140 billion US dollars in
April 2005. Total claims held by the banking sector rose
during the same period from 50 billion US dollars to
around to 263 billion US dollars, and deposits by private
individuals with the banks rose from 10 billion US dol-
lars to around 63 billion. Total bank deposits were most
recently a good 93 billion US dollars, with about one
third held in foreign currencies. The claims in foreign
currencies about matched liabilities, so that the sector as
a whole is no longer as vulnerable to possible exchange
rate changes as it was in the crisis year.
The profitability of the banking sector has risen
again, and business is concentrated more on corporate
and private customers _ as borrowers the private sector
is growing in importance over the public sector. The
banks gradually adopted the International Accounting
Standards (IAS) by the deadline of 1 October 2004, and
some have also adopted the Active-Passive Manage-
ment guidelines. New regulations on capital adequacy
have been in force since the start of 2005, obliging banks
with capital of less than 5 million euros to a risk-
weighted capital adequacy ratio of 10%. From 2007 this
regulation is to apply to all banks, whatever their capi-
tal.
Finally, in the law to create an insurance fund for
bank deposits by natural persons of December 2003 a
necessary step has been taken towards more balanced
competition conditions. It will limit the dominance of the
Sberbank in the private deposits business and give non-
state commercial banks easier access to private savings
deposits for their financing. ARKO established the new
fund with 3 billion roubles; participating banks pay a
quarterly insurance premium of at most 0.15% of their
13  Concrete examples of serious neglect are given in Filippo Ippolito,
loc. cit.
14  Ulrich Thiessen: 'Financial System Development, Regulation and
Economic Growth: Evidence from Russia', DIW Discussion Papers,
no. 400, Berlin 2004.
15  Robert King and Ross Levine: 'Finance and Growth: Schumpeter
Might Be Right', in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 108, no. 3,
1993, pp. 717-737.
16  According to an estimate by Thiessen, if the Russian financial sys-
tem had continued to develop up to the level of Hungary and Poland
between 1998 and 2002 Russia's long-term growth rate would have
been 6.9% higher.
17  Cf. IMF and World Bank: 'Financial Sector Assessment, Russian
Federation', Washington D.C., 2003.294 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 25/2005
deposits insured during the previous quarter. As soon
as the fund has reached the equivalent of 5% of the vol-
ume of deposits insured the premium falls to 0.05%, but
it can also be raised to a maximum of 0.3% under cer-
tain conditions and for a period of up to 18 months. If
the fund cannot meet its obligations from its own means
it can ask the government for financial support.18
... but a number of 
unsolved problems remain
Despite some welcome developments in recent years
considerable problems remain. The dominance of the
two big state banks is unbroken. There are very few
non-Russian banks in the private sector _ only one of the
15 biggest banks is foreign. Moreover, the sector is
greatly fragmented. At the end of 2004 only around one
third of the banks had capital of more than 5 million US
dollars; a further third had capital of between 1 and 5
million US dollars and the remainder had less than 1
million US dollars.
Despite the new regulations the development to a
successful private banking system is very slow. Evi-
dently the ownership is decisive in questions of support
from the RCB, and nationalization, not privatization is
the agenda. This is also clear from the exclusion of for-
eign banks from the deposits insurance fund. The mea-
sures taken by the RCB to overcome the liquidity crisis
were equally questionable, and they also helped to
induce many savers to shift their deposits from the com-
mercial banks to the Sberbank; this temporarily
reversed the trend to a falling market share for the state
bank.19
The Putin government undoubtedly regards market
forces with considerable scepticism _ and to a certain
extent that is understandable. For the Russian economy
is still far removed from that social optimum which
western market apologists believed would easily be
achieved, even in the heartland of the centrally planned
economy, after 1991 through the free play of market
forces. The experience of privatizing the 'crown jewels'
of Russian industry in the 1990s has left its traces, and
the Putin government's reluctance to sell shares in enter-
prises of 'strategic importance' for the country is testi-
mony to that experience, as is the differentiated han-
dling of the oligarchs, as most recently in the Yukos
affair.
Although to a certain extent understandable, the
attitude of the state is a considerable obstacle to the
development of the banking sector. Clear and reliable
legal conditions, especially in ownership law, are essen-
tial for a well-functioning financial system in which peo-
ple can have confidence. Cases like Yukos, and exam-
ples of the arbitrary taxation of withdrawals or ignoring
creditors' rights in banking transactions do not help to
increase confidence in the 'dictatorship of the law',
which Putin likes to evoke, they play a major part in the
continued capital flight from Russia,20 while the amount
of 'mattress money' ordinary people are keeping is esti-
mated at 40 to 80 billion US dollars _ compared with 63
billion US dollars in private bank deposits. 
Solutions need to be adapted to 
Russian conditions
Proposals to improve the situation in the Russian finan-
cial sector need to take account of Russia's special rela-
tion with the market economy system as well as other
factors that are characteristic of the country. These
include the geography. Like the United States, Russia,
with its huge land mass, needs a large number of banks.
The number may seem very high to Europeans, but
most of these banks are very small, and they are provid-
ing banking services for outlying rural areas. In the
United States as well there are enormous productivity
and efficiency differentials between the big banks in the
major centres and the little Savings & Loan Associa-
tions in the provinces. So just as for the United States
there are no convincing reasons why all the banks in
Russia should be universal banks on the continental
European model, as is now the case. In Russia, too,
smaller banks should be limited to the deposits and
lending business to minimize problems of conflicting
interests and insider information, which occur more fre-
quently in universal banking systems.21
One meaningful step would be to introduce a two-
tier banking system.22 Banks in the first segment would
have to meet the directives on capital adequacy and
lending, they would use the electronic payments system
and would be members of the deposits insurance fund.
They would have access to refinancing facilities at the
18  Cf. Alfred Steinherr, loc. cit., p. 14
19  Cf. Alfred Steinherr, loc. cit., p. 7.
20  According to figures from the RCB the capital flight from Russia
reached 7.8 billion US dollars in 2004, four times the 2003 level. So the
declining trend (24.8 billion US dollars in 2000, 15 billion in 2001, 8.8
billion in 2002 and only around 2 billion in 2003) was reversed again
last year.
21  Cf. Alfred Steinherr and Christian Huveneers: 'Institutional Compe-
tition and Innovation', in: Andy Mulineux (ed.): 'European Banking',
London 1992, pp. 130-147.
22  Cf. Daniel Gros and Alfred Steinherr: 'Winds of Change: Economic
Transition in Central and Eastern Europe', London 1995.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 25/2005  295
central bank, and in return would be obliged to maintain
deposits with it. The RCB would act as 'lender of last
resort' for them. The majority of the Russian banks,
which still number more than 1300, and which can only
meet these requirements _ if at all _ with great difficulty,
should be licensed for the second segment. They would
be subject to less stringent directives, but they would
not enjoy the privileges granted to the banks in the first
segment. Potential customers should be made aware,
beyond any doubt, of the resultant differences in risk.
Banks in the second segment would thus have to offer
higher interest rates on deposits and they would tend to
invest in more risky projects. But any payments difficul-
ties that arose for these banks would no longer consti-
tute a risk to the sector as a whole.
This procedure would certainly be preferable to the
threat of closure that would face several hundred ineffi-
cient and scarcely profitable banks. For the banking sec-
tor will de facto be divided into two segments by the
introduction of the deposits insurance fund _ on the one
side the banks that are members of the fund and on the
other those that do not fulfil the conditions and are thus
practically excluded from the deposits business.
A new role for Sberbank
In this context the possible future of Sberbank also
needs to be discussed. As already mentioned, Sberbank
has a full network of branches throughout Russia and is
therefore ideally placed to provide banking services out-
side the densely populated areas as well. But privatizing
the biggest Russian bank is out of the question for the
government, as is giving greater access to foreign
banks, which has been practised in other transition
economies with good results.
One alternative that should be discussed is convert-
ing Sberbank into a 'narrow bank', with its activities
limited to accepting deposits and investing in liquid,
high-quality securities; it would not, however, be
allowed to grant large loans.23 In this way Sberbank
could mainly be used to stimulate the lending market for
small and medium-sized companies. If Sberbank were
obliged to invest a large part of its assets in highly liq-
uid financial assets this could also give a big stimulus to
the development of the money market in Russia. The
state would profit from this through new possibilities
for short-term borrowing as would other commercial
banks, for which financing through deposits is not so
easy. They are currently suffering from the lack of sup-
ply on the domestic interbank market.
Beside these two major reforms a number of smaller
measures could be taken relatively quickly in order to
strengthen the role of the financial intermediaries in the
Russian economy. The payments system, which has
been greatly improved in recent years but still has short-
comings, could be developed further. Especially in real
time payments and payments upon delivery it does not
yet come up to international standards.24
The inadequacy of access to external funds for small
and medium-sized enterprises has repeatedly been
addressed. As well as the above measures the introduc-
tion of a credit information service would be helpful, as
would a 'pledge register' for current assets. The deplor-
able state of much of the Russian building stock indi-
cates the necessity of a well-developed mortgage mar-
ket, which is largely still in its infancy in Russia. In
western countries mortgages are an essential way of
securing loans, particularly loans to small and medium-
sized companies and private households. Improvements
in this area would be important and they should not
encounter insuperable political obstacles.
Finally, on the lenders' side strengthening creditor
protection is at the top of the list, as the IMF and the
World Bank stress in their latest report. That applies
mainly to procedures in cases of insolvency, when the
Russian legislation relies much more on liquidation than
rehabilitation, and where power games between share-
holders often replace seniority of claims as the decisive
criterion.25
There is also still need for action in banking supervi-
sion and regulation. The regulations have been greatly
improved since 1998, and the necessary steps to imple-
ment them have been started in financial legislation.
The RCB should narrow the definition of capital without
delay, and enforce the new definition, like the more
stringent directives on capital adequacy. In lending,
qualitative risk assessments should have greater
weight. The implementation of the IAS since 2004 is a
good starting point here.
Finally, within the banking sector further develop-
ments in corporate governance would be desirable.
Essential progress would be achieved by breaking up
the close ties between the commercial banks and the big
industrial groups that hold most of the shares. 
In the present situation there can be no doubt that
bank managers decide according to the interests of the
majority shareholders and that minority interests have
little protection. One possible solution would be to limit
by law the shares in commercial banks held by big
23  The concept of the 'narrow bank' comes from Bryan and Pierce, cf.
Lowell Bryan: 'Breaking Up the Bank: Rethinking an Industry Under
Siege', New York 1988; James Pierce: 'The Future of Banking', New
Haven 1991.
24  Cf. Alfred Steinherr, loc. cit., p. 15.
25  Cf. IMF and World Bank, loc. cit.296 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 25/2005
industrial corporations, as was practised in the United
States after the world slump with the Glass-Steagal
Act.26
How likely are rapid and comprehensive 
reforms?
The proposals put forward here to improve the develop-
ment of the Russian financial sector are probably more
realistic than many other demands that have been made,
for instance, in regard to privatizing the Sberbank, or to
opening the sector up to foreign competitors.
Nevertheless, in the light of the rather sluggish
development in recent years, rapid and substantial
progress in the direction indicated cannot necessarily be
expected in the near future. In the past the Putin govern-
ment has expressed a basic interest in improving struc-
tures as part of good governance, but the question of
banking reform does not appear to be high up on the
agenda.
Moreover, the key figures _ beside the government
chiefly the RCB and the big industrial corporations that
control most of the commercial banks _ are pursing their
own ends, and these do not generally coincide with max-
imizing prosperity in society as a whole. The risk that
Russia will remain the prisoner of a disadvantageous
equilibrium in this sector too cannot be overlooked.
26  The hope that self-control in the supervisory boards of the commer-
cial banks would produce the desired results has probably not been
fulfilled. At present such codes of conduct are still distinguished by
vague concepts like 'good will' or 'a reasonable attitude'. Cf. Alfred
Steinherr, loc. cit., p. 18. 